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Abstract
In support of US Air Force efforts to conserve resources without sacrificing capa-
bility, this research examines the question of whether the 509th Bomb Wing could
continue to provide maximum combat capability with fewer assigned pilots. During
peacetime, pilot proficiency training comprises the majority of annual flying hours for
the small B-2 bomber fleet. Optimal pilot manning will decrease the accumulation
of excess wear on the airframes; helping to extend the viable life of the B-2 fleet and
preserve the deterrent and combat capabilities that it provides to the United States.
The operations and maintenance activity flows for B-2 aircraft and pilots in a
notional sustained combat scenario are constructed in an Arena discrete-event sim-
ulation model. The model provides the capability to determine optimum manning
levels for combat-qualified B-2 pilots across a range of fleet mission-capable rates.
Determination of actual optimum manning levels is sensitive to duration and prob-
ability parameters; these are unavailable for use in this work. Notional parameter
estimates are used to assess combat mission capability and pilot manning.
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DETERMINING PILOT MANNING
FOR BOMBER LONGEVITY
I. Introduction
Meeting real-world requirements. Doing right by our people. Reduc-
ing excess. Being more efficient. Squeezing costs. Setting priorities and
sticking to them. Making tough choices. These are all things that we
should do as a department and as a military regardless of the time and
circumstance. But they are more important than ever at a time of extreme
fiscal duress, when budget pressures and scrutiny fall on all areas of gov-
ernment, including defense. When every dollar spent on excess overhead
or unneeded programs ... is a dollar not available to support our troops
and prepare for threats on the horizon. [8]
– Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defense
1.1 Background
The US military has been asked to “do more with less.” As a result, development
of a number of planned new weapon systems has been canceled and the operational
lifespan of some systems must be extended rather than even consider replacing them.
With the US and world economies struggling to emerge from a recession, practicing
responsible stewardship of the nation’s resources is as vital now as it has ever been.
In several recent speeches, the US Secretary of Defense has expressed his support
of US Air Force missions in spite of recent difficult budgetary constraints [9]. “Far
from being a skeptic of air power,” Gates offered to cadets at the US Air Force
Academy, “I believe that air supremacy - in all its components will be indispensable
to maintaining American military strength, deterrence, and global reach for decades
to come.” “America’s nuclear deterrent - including the missile and bomber legs
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maintained by the Air Force - will remain a critical guarantor of our security, even as
the nation works toward the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
The US Air Force must make informed decisions in the unending quest to provide
security to America’s citizens and allies and deterrence to those who would be our
enemies.
1.2 Case Study
The United States Air Force’s 509th Bomb Wing (BW) and the Missouri Air
National Guard’s 131st Bomb Wing1 operate, maintain, and train for combat using
19 (out of 20) B-2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers. The B-2 was originally designed
and tasked to be a nuclear-only first-strike bomber but the end of the Cold War
required a change in tasking for the then relatively new aircraft. It also caused the
procurement of the planned 135-aircraft fleet to be halted at only 21. Although
the 509th BW is under the authority of the newly-formed Air Force Global Strike
Command (AFGSC), which is responsible for the nation’s nuclear deterrent forces, the
B-2 can still be assigned conventional strike missions. The B-2 has been employed as a
conventional first-strike bomber in Operation Allied Force (Bosnia, 1999), Operation
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001), Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003), and
Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya, 2011).
The B-2 mission capable (MC) rate has been in decline for several years. Mission
capable rate is a measure used across the Air Force to report whether systems are
capable of performing their peacetime or wartime missions [4:17]. The primary cause
for the slipping MC rate is the difficulty of obtaining parts to replace those which wear
out sooner than anticipated. The B-2 is such a highly specialized aircraft, and such a
small number were built, that manufacturing and stocking replacement parts, other
1The 509th Bomb Wing and the 131st Bomb Wing jointly operate and maintain the B-2 fleet at
Whiteman AFB. Throughout this research, references to the 509th BW also apply to the 131st BW.
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than those which were designed to have a limited life, presents logistical difficulties.
Many of the original manufacturers have gone out of business, taking specialized
production capability with them. For many of the parts, mass manufacturing and
long-term storage is not a feasible option because the small fleet cannot take advantage
of the economy of scale which would drive prices down. The alternative, manufacture
of single parts as they are needed, causes aircraft to sit idle and their missions to
be either canceled or shifted to the other B-2s. This load shifting in turn causes the
other aircraft in the fleet to age faster than anticipated.
Although the B-2 does not need to fly combat missions very often, the small fleet
is under a high degree of stress. The number of aircraft available for peacetime flying
at any time hovers around half the fleet or fewer. Approximately every seven years,
each aircraft goes offline for a full year of programmed depot maintenance (PDM) – a
near-complete disassembly and inspection followed by replacing the life-limited parts
as well as any parts which the inspections reveal need early replacement. With this
schedule, approximately three B-2s are in PDM at any given time [16]. Additionally, it
is not uncommon for one or two B-2s to be parked for several months at a time for the
installation of upgraded components (communications equipment, radars, etc.). As
mentioned, there are often a few B-2s awaiting replacement parts. As an operational
bomber and part of the United States’ nuclear deterrent, several aircraft are always
kept available for real-world contingency use.
Those few remaining B-2s have to accommodate the entirety of the 509th Bomb
Wing’s daily flying activities; the majority of which involve pilot training or main-
taining currency. As B-2 pilots retire, new pilots are trained to replace them. Each
new pilot requires an average of 10 five-hour training sorties. As of November 2010,
there were around 100 B-2 pilots actively assigned to the flying and training units
at WAFB, each required to meet minimum flying currency standards as established
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by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Air Force’s Ready Aircrew Program
(RAP). Depending on the specific tasking level associated with a pilot’s assignment
within the 509th BW, RAP requirements are one or two four-hour sorties per month.
Considering that each flying sortie has a crew of two pilots, the RAP requirements
equate to over 1,000 sorties (4000 flying hours) per year.
Other B-2 sortie requirements are for testing, verification, and yet more training.
Operational test sorties are required to certify upgrades to components, weapons, and
software. Flight safety verification sorties are required after major locally-performed
maintenance. Weapons School pilots accomplishing advanced tactics training have a
flying syllabus to complete which includes local training sorties and deploying with
B-2s and maintenance personnel to Nellis AFB, Nevada for Red Flag and other com-
bat exercises.
The sponsor of this research would like to explore the possibility that there may
currently be too many pilots assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing and that reducing
pilot manning may improve fleet health and longevity. This premise is explored in
this research.
1.3 Research Objective and Scope
The objective of this research is to develop a model representing B-2 combat
operations which may be used to analyze and determine the combat-qualified pilot
manning levels for 509th Bomb Wing under a variety of scenarios. It is proposed
that an optimal manning level will allow the 509th BW to offer the maximum level
of combat force to the President of the United States and relieve some of the stress
on the airframes, helping to sustain the B-2 fleet as a viable weapon system into the
foreseeable future.
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The objective of this research is to develop a technique which may be used to
analyze and determine the combat-qualified pilot manning levels for 509th Bomb
Wing. It is proposed that an optimal manning level will allow the 509th BW to offer
the maximum level of combat force to the President of the United States and relieve
some of the stress on the airframes, helping to sustain the B-2 fleet as a viable weapon
system into the foreseeable future.
The research presented here is based on unclassified information representative of
the system under study. The actual times, probabilities, and capacities for mainte-
nance and operations activities are unavailable for public release, but the structure of
the model is valid and represents a simplification of the 509th Bomb Wing’s histori-
cal B-2 combat operations. After this initial notional study, Air Force Global Strike
Command’s Analysis & Assessment Division (AFGSC/A9) will be given a working
copy of the model so that they may include actual data and generate the type of
results that are presented in this research.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:
• Chapter Two contains a survey and discussion of several categories of published
research which deal with similar topics.
• Chapter Three details the development of the research simulation model and
explains how each component relates to the problem.
• Chapter Four consists of descriptions and analysis of the results of this research
under several different scenarios.
• Chapter Five presents a summary and overall conclusions.
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II. Review of Related Literature
Published research is available which addresses various aspects of properly se-
lecting manning levels for organizations. Many of the methods of addressing general
manning determination are dependent on other techniques used to generate the sched-
ules and shifts for the application in question. The research areas examined in the
development of this work are primarily related to transportation crew scheduling and
the assignment of aircraft to flying routes. Work related to scheduled carriers, not
only airlines, is also applicable to several aspects of the bomber pilot manning prob-
lem. Section 2.3 details the unique aspects which separate this research from available
studies that have been previously published.
2.1 Published Airline-Related Research
Transportation industries, and the airlines in particular, must accomplish opti-
mization at multiple points in the process of planning for efficient scheduled oper-
ations. The names used for the optimization steps required vary, but the specific
functions and their objectives are fairly consistent across the published research and
practices in place. Several authors list the sequence of optimization problems as sched-
ule planning, fleet assignment, aircraft routing, crew pairing, and crew rostering ; this
sequence is used to explore the research available [21, 15].
Due to the size of each problem type and differences in structure and objective,
typical practice is to consider the optimization problems independently and in series.
Sandhu and Klabjan [21:439] identify that “only selected subsets of two of these
problems are modeled and solved as a single integrated problem, e.g., fleeting and
aircraft routing, and aircraft routing and crew pairing.” They give further examples of
the interdependency of the problem stages; noting that some problems are solved over
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subsets of others, decomposed by crew-equipment compatibilities and other tactical
issues.
2.1.1 Schedule Planning.
The initial step in the airline schedule optimization considered by most authors
is the schedule planning phase. Here, the daily flight schedule with origin, destina-
tion, and departure and arrival times, is constructed for the entire network of airports
served [21:439]. The majority of the published schedule planning research uses the as-
sumption that all flights in a schedule are repeated daily. Breaking the problem daily
into an identical (or nearly identical) repeating pattern of flight segments simplifies
the solution process and is a valid simplification because many airline flight schedules
operate in this manner, with slight deviations for weekend and holiday travel [10, 21].
2.1.2 Fleet Assignment.
Fleet assignment, or fleeting, involves the assignment of an equipment type (or
fleet) to each of the flight legs planned in the previous step. An aircraft fleet is defined
by the passenger capacity, operating cost, speed, crew requirement, maintenance
requirements, etc., for the equipment types used by the airline (e.g. Boeing 767-
223ER, CRJ 700, MD-80). Fleet assignment models seek optimal solutions in which
each flight leg is serviced by the most cost-efficient aircraft type in order to maximize
profit – usually the smallest type which meets the typical demand for number of
passengers on the leg, minimizing the average number of empty seats [21, 12, 22].
However, according to Abara [1], “The best aircraft for each flight leg is not always
the one with the highest benefit because, among other reasons, aircraft must be routed
for maintenance, and the number of available aircraft is limited.”
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Abara explains four “intrinsic constraints” on any solution to the fleet assignment
problem [1:22-23]:
• An aircraft completing one flight with an arrival may be used for a subsequent
departing flight as long as there is sufficient connection time between the two
for aircraft servicing and loading. “Flight coverage” guarantees that each flight
leg departing an airport is assigned to no more than one aircraft.
• A flight can include multiple legs and each flight is assigned to a single fleet
type. “Continuity of equipment” ensures the integrity of the fleet assignment
logic by requiring that every leg in a flight is served by the same aircraft type.
• “Schedule balance” allows more of either arrivals or departures at an airport by
forcing some flights to terminate during the day and creating a new flight on a
different aircraft type. This practice is commonly seen by passengers changing
planes during a flight connection.
• “Aircraft count” helps to minimize costs by assigning flights to the minimum
possible number of total aircraft.
After fleet assignment has been accomplished, each of the subsequent problem
steps is considered separately for each fleet type. The model proposed by Sandhu
and Klabjan [21:439] “simultaneously considers fleeting, the plane-count requirement
in aircraft routing, and crew pairing.” The purpose for such ambitious integration is
to avoid the suboptimal solutions which are inevitably accepted when the problems
are considered separately.
2.1.3 Aircraft Routing [21:442].
Aircraft routing is the sequencing of the flights for each aircraft and includes
normal passenger flights and scheduled stops for routine maintenance at particular
locations. Because of differences in the types of flight legs assigned and maintenance
requirements, the aircraft routing problem is solved separately for each aircraft fleet
type.
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2.1.4 Crew Pairing.
Crew pairing is the first of the airline-related problems which considers personnel.
Anonymous crews are generated to meet the requirements from the fleet assignment
and aircraft routing stages. The purpose is to assign aircrews to each of the flights on
the schedule such that personnel costs are minimized. Each aircraft fleet type may re-
quire a unique makeup of the crew members (pilot, first officer, flight attendants) and
each must have the proper qualifications. Crew pairing includes not only generating
the aircrews, but also sequencing several flights, potentially over multiple days, which
start and end at a city where the crew is based. Normal personnel costs include the
crew salaries and hotel and taxi fees that are necessary when crews must spend the
night away from their crew base. Costs can increase above the normal levels because
crews are guaranteed a minimum number of paid hours per day while traveling, even
if they do not actually fly for that amount of time [21:442-443]. Crew salaries and
travel pay make up the second most expensive portion of airlines’ budgets, second
only to fuel [10, 15]. Excess costs are minimized through careful crew pairing and
schedule optimization. According to Sandhu and Klabjan,
The crew-pairing problem is difficult to solve due to the following two
reasons. The number of pairings and thus variables, is in the order of
billions even for a medium-size fleet family of 200 flights. Also, the calcu-
lation of the cost of a pairing is very complex within dynamic generation
of pairings, and a large number of complicated rules need to be taken into
account while generating pairings. [21:443]
Pairings also must satisfy several types of rules in order to be valid. Federal
aviation safety regulations limit maximum consecutive flying time and mandate the
length of rest periods between duty days or flights. Union and airline-specific rules
may further impose minimum time off, minimum pay for flight legs or duty days, and
maximum number of flight hours in a set time period for pilots [21, 15, 10, 20].
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2.1.5 Crew Rostering.
While some authors consider crew pairing and crew rostering to be part of the
same problem, the majority of published research separates the two.
The crew pairing problem generates the required classes of aircrews from the
available crew member types, ensuring that each flight has a feasible aircrew makeup.
Regarding crew rostering, each specific instance of an aircrew is generated by assigning
particular individuals to the aircrew for each flight. This is the stage in which an
employee’s actual work schedule is produced. In addition to the flight legs, additional
activities may be added to each individual schedule at this point; examples include
off-duty time, training, etc. Crew rostering also considers personal preferences and
quality of life aspects for the airline’s employees – most airlines use a bidline system
in which individuals express their preferences for particular flights and schedules. [15]
Figure 1 and the following text are excerpted from the thorough work by Kohl
and Karisch on the crew pairing and rostering problems, and are applicable to the
current research.
Figure 1. Representation of Inputs to the Airline Crew Rostering Problem [15:228]
The input for a crew rostering problem consists in general of crew
information, activities to be rostered, rules and regulations, and objectives
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for the creation of the rosters. However, when creating bidlines, i.e.,
anonymous rosters, individual crew aspects are not considered.
When producing personalized rosters, each crewmember’s personal
records, qualifications, pre-assigned activities, and vacation days are given.
The records usually contain accumulated attributes such as hours flown
during the current calendar year. Other values of interest are due dates
for training or possible exceptions from certain rules and regulations. Per-
sonal qualifications contain for instance information about the equipment
the crewmember can operate or a list of destinations the crewmember
cannot fly to. For cabin crew, language proficiency is an important quali-
fication for international flights. Pre-assigned activities could be training,
office duties or medical checks.
The set of activities which are assigned consists of pairings, reserves
(e.g., airport and home standby duties), ground duties (e.g., medical
checks), and training activities (e.g., simulator training and courses).
[15:227-228]
The methodology for the research into bomber pilot manning is most closely re-
lated to the crew rostering problem because of the requirements that crew schedules
must satisfy flight safety rules, consider pilot qualifications, and include training and
other duties.
2.2 Published Solution Methods
Operations research (OR) methods have been applied to airline-related problems
since before 1960 [17:3]. Broad categories of OR tools employed include mathematical
programming, networks, heuristics, simulation, as well as combined approaches. The
following sections provide brief examples of some of these techniques as they have
been applied to airline-related problems.
2.2.1 Mathematical Programming.
Linear programming, integer programming, and mixed-integer programming are
the most common approaches applied to find solutions to airline and even more general
scheduling problems. The flexibility of the objective and constraint structures of the
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varieties of mathematical programming are quite well suited to airline problems which
are intended to minimize cost or maximize profit. Examples of constraints which must
be fulfilled are: takeoffs must equal landings; each flight requires an aircraft and a
particular number of crew members – each with particular qualifications; and so on.
In 1989 J. Abara published a relevant paper on the application of integer pro-
gramming (IP) to the fleet assignment problem. The paper, which has been cited
nearly 200 times in published literature alone, provides an overview of the fleet as-
signment problem for American Airlines and an easy-to-read definition of the entire
IP model in use at the time. Abara suggests that one objective to be maximized
may be “utilization of the most efficient aircraft,” and that possible constraints are
limits on “the number of aircraft that remain overnight at a particular station” (due
to space restrictions) and daily “limits on arrivals or departures” at an airport [1].
According to Kohl and Karisch, most methods for solving the crew rostering prob-
lem are based on the “generate-and-optimize principle.” First “a large number of legal
rosters is generated” in the generation subproblem, meeting safety and contractual
rules. Then a logically-selected subset of those rosters is examined and “a set parti-
tioning type problem is solved to select exactly one roster for each crewmember such
that the demands of the activities are met, the solution satisfies constraints between
several crewmembers, and the objective is optimized” [15:224]. “The assignment con-
straints make sure that each crewmember gets assigned exactly one roster,” and “the
activity constraints ensure that each activity is assigned exactly once in the solution”
[15:226].
2.2.2 Networks.
Network models can be readily applied to the airline problems because of the
point-to-point nature of the flights and connections in space and time. Gu, Johnson,
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Nemhauser, and Wang [12:59] approach the fleet assignment problem as a “min-cost
multicommodity flow problem on a time-space directed graph.”
Sherali, Bish, and Zhu [22:3-4] detail two different representations of the fleet as-
signment models using a network structure. For a connection network structure, a
node-arc graph is created which represents all feasible flight connections at a single
airport in one day. “Nodes represent points in time when flights arrive or depart”
and the network includes imaginary source and sink nodes to symbolize aircraft be-
ginning or ending the day at the airport. The three types of possible connections
are illustrated by three types of arcs. “Originating (connection) arcs” link the air-
craft available at the beginning of the day with the possible departure nodes. “Flight
connection arcs link the arrival nodes to the departure nodes.” And “terminating
(connection) arcs” link the arrival nodes to the imaginary sink node when the air-
craft overnight at the airport. Feasible flight connections (those allowing adequate
turn time) are the focus of this type of network representation, and the solution as-
signs aircraft types to the set of arcs which maximizes expected revenue, ensuring
that all connections are included.
Time-space network structures focus on the flight legs and the model assigns
connections, dependent on time and space feasibilities. This structure reduces the
number of decision variables “because the number of flight legs is far lesser than the
number of possible connections.” It is noted that since this network structure was
first applied to fleet assignment in 1993, it has become the preferred approach. The
interested reader is referred to the referenced tutorial for an example and further
details. [22:6]
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2.2.3 Simulation.
Simulation is a modeling tool which is often used to compare alternative scenarios
or to identify bottlenecks within a system. Hafizogullari, Chinnusamy, and Tunasar
[13] used discrete event simulation to study the flow of passengers transferring between
airline flights in a proposed new terminal at a major airport. Their research examined
“minimum connect time” and “passenger walking distance” as performance measures
to compare alternative terminal designs. The rationale for their choice of simulation
is both interesting and applicable to the study of bomber pilot manning because of
the potential for bottlenecks and interdependencies.
Accurately modeling the operation of a real-world process over time,
such as the flow of passengers through an airport, can result in prob-
lems of immense magnitude and complexity. Although many operations
research techniques such as linear/integer programming, stochastic pro-
gramming, and queuing theory provide valuable insights, they often fail
to represent large-scale problems that arise in airport terminal design due
to poor scalability or excessive computational burden. We use simula-
tion modeling to represent operations in a terminal building because of
its ability to capture complex relationships and scalability. The processes
at an airport are interdependent. Separate modeling and optimization of
individual components may result in sub-optimal solutions. Simulation
addresses this problem by quantifying the interdependencies and finding
bottlenecks. Solving one bottleneck may cause another bottleneck to de-
velop somewhere else in the system and the modeler needs to consider the
total system performance. [13:1193]
Gosavi, Ozkaya, and Kahraman [11] employed simulation-based optimization to
solve an airline seat-allocation problem, optimizing the number of seats assigned to
each fare class in order to maximize profit while considering realistic policies and some
random occurrences. They note that “simulation can easily accommodate realistic
assumptions (such as cancellations and overbooking), which often render theoretical
models intractable” [11:22].
Rosenberger et al. [20] used a stochastic discrete-event simulation model to study
the effects of flight disruptions (e.g., cancellations and delays) on airline schedules
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and performance. Their model includes all of the aspects of daily flight operations, at
an appropriate level of aggregation, and may be used to test how an airline’s recovery
policies should affect the solutions to the fleet assignment, aircraft routing, and crew
scheduling problems.
2.3 Unique Aspects of this Research
Much of the staffing level optimization research available in the published lit-
erature deals with either minimizing cost or maximizing profit and is not directly
applicable to the objectives of this work. This research is focused on developing a
model which may be used to determine efficient manning levels for a military bomber
aircraft fleet and is unique from other works available due of the extreme length of the
employees’ tasks and particularly because the scheduling of each shift is dependent on
resource availability rather than on a fixed schedule. The aim of the model developed
through this research is to maximize the number of combat missions that can be flown
while minimizing unnecessary strain on the aircraft and the parts and maintenance
system through identifying potential overages in manpower. Successfully executed
combat missions can serve as the measure of performance for the 509th Bomb Wing
in this research and the “cost” to be minimized is the physical wear on the B-2 fleet.
The employees of interest are the B-2 pilots, and only a portion of their schedule is
of interest. The only shifts examined are those directly related to flying the B-2 mis-
sions. Aside from pre- and post-mission rest and duties, this research is not concerned
with any of the pilots’ activities (e.g., ground duties or training activities) when they
are not actually flying a mission.
While airline, retail, and most other shift scheduling research primarily deals with
shifts shorter than 24 hours, each B-2 mission in this research occupies the pilots for
over 100 consecutive hours. The daily schedule repetition assumption is not applicable
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to the long-duration bomber mission problem and unnecessary because the creation of
detailed crew schedules is not considered. The military environment and the “at war”
scenario preclude serious consideration of some of the scheduling factors presented in
section 2.1.5.
One example of manning research with similar long-duration scheduling require-
ments is a study to determine the annual firefighter staffing level which minimizes pay
and overtime, while ensuring coverage of both short-term and long-term absences [7].
Another paper which proved helpful in the development of this research was Ger-
shkoff’s work on flight crew schedule optimization [10:34-36]. His general strategy
of exploring and capturing all of the rules and constraints applicable to the man-
ning problem is reflected in the model development methodology in Chapter 3. The
methodology, scenario, and model design for this research are detailed in Chapter 3.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Research Methodology
This research examines the impact of pilot manning levels and B-2 mission capable
rates on overall combat capability. A discrete-event simulation model of B-2 combat
operations is produced which provides the number of combat missions executed with
varying numbers of available pilots and B-2 aircraft. The model simulates 90 days
of continuous combat missions and analysis demonstrates that there exists a pilot
manning level at which combat capability would not suffer, regardless of the B-2’s
mission capable rate.
3.1.1 Discrete-event Simulation.
When using a simulation model, all items of interest are represented by entities
which travel along a fixed path, stopping at the modules (sometimes called blocks)
which represent activities. A discrete-event simulation uses the simplifying constraint
that an entity’s state may only be changed at discrete points in time.
Discrete-event simulation is chosen as the method with which to approach the
current bomber pilot manning research. The stochastic nature of the interrelated
operations and maintenance activities is easily translated into a delay-driven schedule-
flow simulation. The potential to identify bottlenecks, the capability to compare
alternative scenarios (i.e., pilot manning levels), and the ease of updating model
parameters when additional data becomes available, all make simulation an ideal tool
for analyzing the manning question.
As an example, consider a morning commute to work. The entity represents the
commuter and its first state is at home. At some point in time the commuter leaves
home and is now commuting. The end of the commute is signaled by arrival at
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work. Initially, these three states may not seem adequate to characterize someone’s
morning routine. However, defining important milestones in the schedule as bound-
aries between the three states and allowing the proper amount of time in each state,
successfully defines the morning in discrete events. For this example, say at home
requires an average of one hour to get ready, eat, etc., then leaving the driveway
begins commuting, which usually takes 25 minutes, and finally, stepping into building
the commuter is at work.
One purpose of a discrete-event simulation is to gain insight about how changes
affect a system. The next step in the morning commute model could be to examine
the possibility of changing the route taken to work. The benefit of a simulation is
that it can make the commute thousands of times and report back statistics on how
long the average morning routine is likely to take. To provide this type of insight the
model requires certain data.
3.1.2 The Triangular Distribution.
Each time an entity arrives at a block representing an activity or a decision, the
simulation model needs to randomly select a duration or probability to apply to the
entity. A triangular distribution is helpful when the amount of data available about
an activity’s duration is limited, but good estimates of the range of times that it may
take, as well as its most likely duration are available. Generally the shortest possible,
longest possible, and most likely durations are represented by the symbols a, b, and c,
respectively.
The probability distribution function (PDF) for the triangular distribution and a
continuous random variable X (representing an activity’s duration in this model) is
defined by Equation (1). The value of the PDF represents the probability of X falling
between any two fixed values between the lower limit, a, and the upper limit, b [14].
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A general example plot for the triangular distribution PDF is illustrated in Figure 2.
The total area under the plotted line equals one, which is to be expected because the
activity duration must fall between a and b and thus the probability that a ≤ x ≤ b
must equal 1.
f(x) =

2(x−a)
(b−a)(c−a) for a ≤ x ≤ c
2(b−x)
(b−a)(b−c) for c ≤ x ≤ b
0 otherwise
(1)
Figure 2. Triangular Distribution PDF Example Plot [23]
In the morning routine example, let the random variable x represent the commute
time for any day and assume that the commute can never be shorter than 15 minutes
(a = 15), never longer than 30 minutes (b = 30), and usually takes 25 minutes
(c = 25). The continuous property of the triangular distribution mirrors reality
in that commute times may be fractions of minutes (i.e., 22.4 minutes). Also, by
definition, the duration of the commute is always between fifteen and thirty minutes
so P (15 ≤ x ≤ 30) = 1.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the triangular distribution is de-
fined by Equation (2). As it is used in this model, the value of the CDF represents
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the probability that the randomly selected value of the duration X will be less than
or equal to a fixed value, x, within the activity’s possible range of durations. Figure
3 is a plot of the CDF of a general triangular distribution and, along with Table 1,
will be helpful in explaining the CDF. Table 1 lists some potential values for x, where
x is the commute length in the morning routine example. The CDF identifies that
there is only a 6% probability of making the commute in 18 minutes or less, but the
probability of making the commute in 27 minutes or less is 88%.
F (x) =

(x−a)2
(b−a)(c−a) for a ≤ x ≤ c
1 − (b−x)
2
(b−a)(b−c) for c ≤ x ≤ b
(2)
Figure 3. Triangular Distribution CDF Example Plot [23]
Table 1. Triangular Distribution CDF Example Data
Value of x 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Cumulative Probability 0.000 0.007 0.027 0.060 0.107 0.167 0.240 0.327
Value of x 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Cumulative Probability 0.427 0.540 0.667 0.787 0.880 0.947 0.987 1.000
A simulation model uses a random number generator (RNG) to select activity
durations, but generally, RNGs generate random numbers between 0 and 1. Since
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value of the CDF is also between 0 and 1, the CDF may be inverted by solving it for
the value of X. Equation (3) is the triangular inverse CDF. The input variables for
the inverse CDF are the triangular distribution parameters a, b, and c, and a random
number U between 0 and 1. The model uses the triangular inverse CDF to map each
random number to a feasible outcome (e.g., an activity duration).
X =

a +
√
(b− a)(c− a)U for a ≤ x ≤ c
b−
√
(b− a)(b− c)(1 − U) for c ≤ x ≤ b
(3)
For the morning routine example, the primary variable of interest is commute
time. When the entity arrives at the commuting block, the simulation draws a random
number, say 0.88, and applies the inverse CDF. Since the inverse CDF with U = 0.88
gives X = 27 (also note that 0.88 was the probability that the CDF associated with
a 27 minute or faster commute time) the simulation uses 27 minutes for the commute
time on this particular day. Figure 4 illustrates the mapping from 0.88 to 27 using
the inverse CDF for this example. Since commute time is random for each day, it will
be assigned a different random value on the next day.
3.1.3 Common Random Numbers.
When it is necessary to compare simulation results across different model condi-
tions, such as two routes to work, it is preferable to have confidence that the observed
differences were caused by intentional changes to the model, not merely by the ran-
domness of the random numbers. This is accomplished through the use of common
random numbers (CRNs), a strategy which allows the generated random numbers to
be synchronized across simulation runs. When using CRNs, each variable is assigned
the same sequence of random values every time the simulation is run. So for the
morning routine example, let the model simulate three months with traveling via
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Figure 4. Triangular Distribution Inverse CDF Example Plot [23]
route (1) and three months traveling via route (2), the same random number will be
used to generate the commute time on any specific day in both cases. This way there
is no potential of the simulation generating all commute times on the short end of
the expected range for route (1) and all commute times on the long end for route (2).
3.1.4 Analysis Strategy.
Each run of the B-2 combat flow simulation consists of 90 days of continuous
combat missions. The primary variables of interest in this research are the B-2 mission
capable (MC) rate, which can be translated into how many aircraft are available for
operational tasking, and the number of assigned combat-qualified pilots. A variable
of secondary interest is the number of pilots sent ahead to the mission stopover
location to ferry B-2s back to Whiteman Air Force Base (WAFB). The practice of
transporting pilots to another location as passengers is called “deadheading” and is
further explained in section 3.2.2.
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For each level of B-2 mission capable rate examined (section 3.3.2), the number
of combat-qualified pilots and the number deadheading to the stopover location are
independently varied and the number of completed combat missions recorded. The
model is used to explore wide ranges for both values in order to observe trends in the
output, both above and below the values yielding the apparent optimal pilot manning
level.
It is proposed that for each B-2 MC rate studied with this model there exists a
pilot manning level which, if exceeded, does not contribute to the 509th Bomb Wing’s
total combat capability (as defined by the number of combat missions completed in
90 days). This point of diminishing returns is labeled the indicated optimal B-2 pilot
manning level. The indicated optimal pilot manning levels for the various MC rates
provide insight into the effect of less than ideal aircraft mission capability on both
combat capability and aircraft overuse due to possible overmanning.
3.2 Scenario Development
The B-2 has flown in combat in Operation Allied Force (OAF) (Bosnia, 1999),
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan, 2001), Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) (Iraq, 2003), and Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya, 2011). Although it was
initially intended to be a nuclear-only bomber, the B-2’s long range and immense
payload capability has earned it a leading role in modern conventional warfare. In
order to explore pilot manning and combat capability, this research employs a discrete-
event simulation model representing a simplified version of daily pilot and aircraft
operations at the 509th Bomb Wing during a notional combat scenario.
The scenario is designed to simulate a high degree of stress on the operations and
maintenance processes of the 509th Bomb Wing. In the scenario, the 509th BW is
tasked to provide as many conventional combat missions as possible in 90 days. A
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90-day bombing period is chosen as a reasonable expected maximum length that the
B-2’s capabilities would be required. B-2s flew combat missions in support of OAF
for eight weeks [2]. The simulated bombing campaign is chosen to be conventional,
rather than nuclear, in order to allow a longer scenario.
The purpose of the scenario is to simulate the structure of the actual B-2 opera-
tions and maintenance processes using entities for the pilots and the B-2s. Simulating
the operational scenario provides the number of combat missions completed under the
given conditions.
3.2.1 Simplified Scenario.
This section describes the mission flow for both the pilots and the B-2s in a
simplified combat scenario and has the purpose of familiarizing the reader with the
B-2 operations included in this research. Missions flown under this scenario launch
from WAFB, fly into combat, then return to WAFB. This type of nonstop tound-
trip combat mission was employed in OAF, OEF, and Operation Odyssey Dawn [2].
Figure 5 depicts the flow of all activities which impact the schedules of all the B-2s
and pilots for this simplified scenario.
The dotted-bordered boxes in the upper third of Figure 5 represent all of the
activities which occur for every B-2 before and after a combat mission. The solid-
bordered boxes in the middle are the mission activities which require both a B-2 and
an aircrew. Activities involving only the pilots are shown in the dashed-bordered
boxes in the lower third of the figure.
When the order to go into combat is received by the 509th BW, all available
B-2s and pilots can be tasked immediately. The available B-2s are loaded with the
munitions required for the combat mission. Available pilots are batched into aircrews
consisting of two pilots and assigned a combat mission. The aircrews mission-plan for
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Figure 5. Simplified Scenario Mission Flow
approximately one working day, familiarizing themselves with the mission’s routing,
targets, and other important details. The aircrew members are then given 48 hours to
rest in preparation for the long-duration mission. Shortly before the planned takeoff
time, the B-2 is fueled and readied for flight. In this scenario, B-2 preflight procedures
are performed by a spare aircrew in order to allow the mission aircrew to begin their
flight as rested as possible.
The aircrew completes their combat mission, lands back at WAFB, then shuts
down the B-2, a process which includes running multiple checklists and completing
aircraft performance-related paperwork. At this time, the pilots accomplish their
post-mission debriefing and then are allowed time to rest and return their bodies to
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a normal work/sleep schedule. This pilot recovery time is set at 30 hours in this
research. Once the pilots have completed their post-mission recovery, they resume
their normal day-to-day jobs within the bomb wing until they are assigned another
combat mission.
After the B-2 is shut down, any munitions which were not expended in combat
are unloaded and returned to the weapon storage and staging area. Maintenance per-
sonnel then accomplish routine post-flight maintenance and inspections and conduct
unscheduled maintenance to repair any additional problems. After maintenance, the
low observable coatings on the exterior of the B-2 must be touched up, especially if
damage from hitting birds, flying through hail, etc. during the mission was noted.
After the B-2 is returned to the proper operating condition, it is available to be
assigned to another combat mission. A modification of these interwoven schedule cy-
cles is executed continuously for 90 days for every B-2 and every pilot in this research
model.
3.2.2 Research Scenario.
The simplified scenario described in section 3.2.1 represents, for instance, the
political worst-case situation where the United States may not be allowed to land the
B-2 in any foreign country and is forced into making round-trip combat sorties. The
simplified scenario could also be used if the target area is close enough to the US that
the duration of a round-trip combat mission would not be overly long. This section
describes the scenario which is implemented in this research and was employed in
OIF. Although it is more complex, this scenario is preferable because it decreases the
risk of pilot fatigue and therefore is safer for both the pilots and the aircraft.
In order to reduce pilot fatigue during combat missions in this scenario, the B-2s
land at a stopover location and undergo minimal post-flight maintenance. A fresh
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aircrew then returns the B-2 to Whiteman AFB. The stopover location could be any
properly-equipped location within several hours of flight from the combat area. In
past operations, both Guam and Diego Garcia have been used as stopover locations
[16]. Depending on the location of the combat area and the stopover location in
relation to WAFB, performing the stopover could cut sixteen hours or more off of
the combat mission. Any reduction in flight time from the post-combat phase of the
mission greatly decreases the risks to the pilots who will have been flying for over
twenty four hours and whose adrenaline will likely be depleted.
Figure 6 depicts the activity flow for B-2s and pilots for the scenario used in this
research. In the diagram for this scenario, all activities for the B-2 only are in the
center, pilot-only activities are on the left for WAFB and on the right for the stopover
location, and mission activities (requiring a B-2 and an aircrew) are at the top and
bottom.
The basic activity flow is identical to that of the simplified scenario; with mod-
ifications only to accommodate flight operations from two locations. As detailed
in section 3.3.9, it is assumed that limited maintenance support is available at the
stopover location.
At the beginning of the 90-day combat simulation, a portion of the B-2 pilots travel
via commercial airline or military transport to the stopover location. This practice
of having pilots travel without performing any crew duties is called “deadheading”
and is expensive to the Air Force both in terms of travel costs and lost productivity
in those pilots’ jobs at WAFB [10, 20]. Deadheading pilots to the stopover point is
necessary in this scenario in order to keep the B-2s in the air as much as possible.
Without deadheading pilots, once a B-2 lands at the stopover, it sits idle until the
aircrew that flew it in combat recovers from the combat flight, mission-plans, and
rests for the flight back to WAFB, an 80-hour sequence on average in this research.
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Figure 6. Research Scenario Mission Flow
The deadheaded pilots at the stopover location form the starting population for a
secondary available pool of rested pilots who are available to ferry each B-2 back to
WAFB as soon as post-flight maintenance is completed.
As the second round of combat missions are completed, the pilots who were ini-
tially deadheadeded are replaced at the stopover location by pilots just coming from
combat. If mission timing is correct, the pilots from the first round of combat mis-
sions are recovered, have mission planned the ferry mission back to WAFB, and are
completing their crew rest as the B-2s become available. This rest-combat-rest-ferry
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pattern is repeated by all of the pilots over the 90-day scenario and is initially jump-
started by the deadheaded pilots. Given enough pilots are initially deadheaded, this
model keeps each B-2 on the ground at the stopover location for an average of only
15 hours, 65 hours fewer than without deadheading.
The primary risks in deadheading pilots to the stopover location are that either
too few or too many are sent. As discussed previously, too few deadheaded pilots
cause B-2s to sit idle at the stopover. Sending too large a fraction of the B-2 pilots
to wait at the stopover degrades the ability of the 509th BW to maintain efficient
combat operations because many of the pilots are stuck at the stopover location and
there are fewer pilots at WAFB to conduct normal operations. A secondary objective
of this research is to determine the appropriate number of pilots to deadhead for each
of the B-2 mission capable rates and pilot manning levels explored.
3.3 Model Design
The simulation model built for this research matches the structure of the research
combat scenario described in section 3.2.2. The discussion that follows provides details
on both the additional logic required to represent the scenario in a discrete-event
simulation as well as the triangular distribution parameters used for the activity
durations.
The independent input variables are:
• The number of B-2s available for combat (which is a function of the mission
capable rate as explained in section 3.3.2).
• The total number of combat-qualified B-2 pilots assigned to operational units
at Whiteman AFB.
• The number of B-2 pilots deadheaded to the stopover location.
The output value of interest from the simulation is the total number of completed
combat missions for each combination of the input variables.
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Figures 11 and 12, presenting the model structure, and Table 9, listing the activity
duration distributions for each block in the model, are found in Appendix A.
3.3.1 Fleet Size.
The original B-2 fleet consisted of 21 aircraft; 20 assigned to Whiteman AFB for
training and operations, and one assigned to Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards
AFB, California. One of the WAFB aircraft crashed on takeoff from Anderson AFB
on Guam in February 2008 and was declared a total loss [18]. In February 2010,
another B-2 suffered an engine fire and will be returned to service after a complete
overhaul [3]. This research model assumes that all 20 remaining aircraft will be
committed to combat operations.
3.3.2 Aircraft Availability.
As defined in AFI 10-603, an aircraft is reported to be fully mission capable (FMC)
if it can perform all of its assigned missions and partially mission capable (PMC) if it
can perform at least one, but not all, of its assigned missions [4:35]. Mission capability
codes are reported for each individual aircraft and aggregated across the entire B-2
fleet. A particular aircraft is not mission capable (NMC) if it cannot perform any
assigned missions – for example, when it is disassembled for maintenance. The mission
capable rate for a time period is calculated using Equation 4. Possessed hours for
each B-2 is the amount of time during the period in question that the 509th Bomb
Wing actually has operational control of the aircraft. Examples of nonpossession
would be when a B-2 is in programmed depot maintenance (PDM) or is undergoing
a major modification. In these cases the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, is in
possession of the aircraft and that time is excluded from the denominator of the MC
rate equation.
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MC Rate =
FMC hours + PMC hours
Possessed Hours
× 100 (4)
Air Force Times published the mission capable rates for all USAF aircraft systems
for the fiscal year ending September 2010, these rates are are included in Appendix
B. The 2010 mission capable rate for the B-2 fleet was 54.86% [19]. When the Air
Force sets a goal for a system MC rate, they must “consider system operating time ...
in that the more a system operates in a given period of time, the more downtime for
corrective and preventative maintenance is required [4].” Considering this statement,
and the definition of MC rate, a mission capable rate of 100 percent is not possible
because every aircraft requires downtime, at the least for preventative maintenance,
and eventually for unscheduled maintenance. The premise of this research is that it
is possible to identify a pilot manning level which allows the 509th BW to deliver
maximum combat capability and reduces the number of peacetime training sorties to
a level which requires less corrective maintenance downtime and thus increases the
B-2’s MC rate.
One of the primary variables explored in this simulation model is the B-2 MC
rate. With 20 total B-2s in the fleet, this research assumes that three are in PDM,
leaving 17 in the possession of the 509th Bomb Wing. With 17 aircraft committed to
the combat effort, this research explores the impact that various MC rates would have
on the number of combat missions executed. It is assumed that all of the logistics,
maintenance, and operations infrastructure and manning are at the levels required to
generate each particular fleet MC rate. Working under this assumption, the model is
not required to include maintainer manning, parts supply, etc.
B-2 combat capability is investigated using four levels of the MC rate: 53%, 65%,
76%, and 88%. Selection of the MC rates to explore is based on what are deemed
to be reasonable values for NMC time per week. Equation (4) is rearranged into
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Equation (5), converting a given MC rate into average mission capable hours per
aircraft per week. The average number of hours per week that each aircraft is not
mission capable is then given by Equation 6.
MC Hours per week = 24 × 7 × MC Rate
100
(5)
NMC Hours per week = (24 × 7) − MC Hours per week (6)
By Equation (5), the FY 2010 MC rate translates to an average of 76 hours of
NMC time per week for each B-2. For comparison, average weekly MC and MNC
time per aircraft using the published 2010 MC rates are given in Appendix B for
all US Air Force aircraft systems. The four MC rates explored in this research span
values of 20 NMC hours per week to 79 NMC hours per week.
With 17 B-2s committed to combat and the fleet performing at a particular MC
rate, that percentage of the fleet is in a mission capable state at any time, on average.
Table 2 gives the average number of B-2s available for executing combat missions
under the chosen MC rates in this model, along with the corresponding average
values for MC hours and NMC hours per week. In each case it is planned to use all
17 B-2s in combat but, on average, the number over the calculated available limit
are nonflyable. In reality, these nonflyable aircraft are the causal factor behind the
mission capable rate.
Table 2. B-2s Available for Combat Varies According to MC Rate
MC Rate B-2s Available MC hours per week NMC hours per week
53% 9 89 79
65% 11 109 59
76% 13 128 40
88% 15 148 20
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3.3.3 B-2 and Pilot Simulation.
The simulation scenario begins with the order for the 509th Bomb Wing to prepare
for war and terminates after 90 days. In a realistic scenario, when the execution order
arrives, some of the B-2s would be flying standard peacetime missions, others might
be undergoing post-flight maintenance, and several would be hangared in perfect
maintenance condition awaiting war orders. Allowing the simulation software to
begin at time zero with all of the mission capable B-2s ready and available would not
capture this time spacing effect between aircraft. This is simulated by allowing the
B-2 entities to enter the simulation according to an exponential distribution, with a
mean time between arrivals of four hours. The first B-2 is immediately available and
the others become available as time progresses.
Pilot availability at the start of combat preparations follows a similar pattern.
Pilots enter the simulation at a exponentially distributed rate with an average three
pilots becoming available per hour. The exponential distribution is appropriate to
represent pilots and aircraft becoming available because each successive arrival time
is independent of all others. Each pilot is an individual whose schedule does not
necessarily depend on the schedules of the other pilots. Similarly, each B-2 requires
a different amount of time to complete its mission or maintenance before becoming
available for combat preparations.
3.3.4 Sortie Duration.
Including variable duration for all of the B-2 sorties allows the model to account
for for difference in targets, stopover locations and for other random variations that
are inherent in air travel. Weather, wind, and aerial refueling wait times, just to
name a few, can change the duration of a flight from one mission to the next.
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The combat sortie durations used in the model are based on combat sorties flown
during past operations and extrapolated to allow combat reach to almost any location
in the world. 23 hours is selected as the minimum expected combat mission duration,
28 hours as most likely, and 34 as the maximum expected duration. These durations
allow for sorties launched from WAFB to execute their combat missions and land
at a stopover location. For the ferry missions (returning B-2s and pilots back to
WAFB from the stopover location) 20 hours, 24 hours, and 26 hours are used for the
minimum, most likely, and maximum sortie times, respectively. The ferry missions are
shorter than combat missions because they are more direct flights from the stopover
location to WAFB.
3.3.5 Flying Hour Restrictions.
Much like the inputs to the crew rostering problem illustrated in Figure 1, the
B-2 pilots’ schedules can only be feasible if certain rules and activities are satisfied.
Air Force flight safety rules limit the number of hours that pilots may fly within each
7-day, 30-day, and 90-day period. The maximum allowable flying times are 56 flying
hours per 7 consecutive days, 125 flying hours per 30 consecutive days, and 330 flying
hours per 90 consecutive days [6:63]. Since the operational scenario runs for 90 days,
the model must avoid assigning pilots to missions which would cause them to go over
any of these limits during any mission.
Checks for these restrictions are implemented as a submodel, consisting of seven
decide blocks in a waterfall-like structure. This submodel is executed for each pilot
before they are assigned to an aircrew and a mission. There are two time elements
addressed in this logic; the rolling 7-day, 30-day, and 90-day windows, and the total
flying times within those windows. Two of the decide blocks check whether the
current simulation time has reached 7 or 30 days. If these milestones have not yet
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been reached, the next level of decide blocks check whether the pilot’s cumulative
flying time from the beginning of the simulation plus the maximum expected duration
for the mission type to be flown next (combat or ferry) is greater than the 56 or 125
hour limits, respectively. If the combat scenario time has passed 7 or 30 days, the pilot
entity passes to the next level of decide blocks. These blocks check whether the pilot
would violate the 7-day or 30-day flying hour limits if they were to fly a combat or
ferry mission (either of which could potentially take the maximum expected duration).
The final decide block includes a check of whether the pilot could accomplish the
next mission without exceeding the 90-day flying hour limit. If at any point, the
pilot is unable to accomplish the next mission without potentially exceeding any of
the flying hour restrictions, they must wait one day and then reaccomplish the flying
hour clearance submodel.
3.3.6 Other Pilot Unavailability.
As with all schedules, there may be situations where a pilot is unavailable to fly
a mission. An injured or sick pilot, for instance, would not be tasked with flying a
mission and would be assigned duties not to include flying status (DNIF) until cleared
to fly again. This occurrence is represented in the model by adding a random failure
point just before the pilots are formed into aircrews. Once identified as DNIF, the
pilot will have to wait until their condition improves before being reevaluated and
released to fly. For pilots at Whiteman, the model assigns a 5% probability that any
particular pilot is DNIF. At the stopover, only a 2% DNIF probability is assigned
because the pilots will be resting and not be as likely to get injured or exposed to
germs as they would normally when interacting with their families and the public.
This flight clearance process occurs at the end of the flying hour clearance sub-
model. Once the pilot has cleared the flight safety checks, there is a final decide
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block which allows 95% of the pilots at WAFB, and 98% of the pilots at the stopover
location, to exit the submodel and be assigned to an aircrew and a mission. The
pilots who are not medically cleared to fly must wait a randomly assigned number of
days and then reaccomplish the flying hour clearance submodel. At both locations,
the model uses one day, two days, and 90 days as the minimum, most likely, and
maximum number of days until being medically cleared. Shorter DNIF times repre-
sent minor cold-type illnesses. Longer DNIF times cover the spectrum of week-long
flu up to a broken bone, which would ground a pilot for the remainder of the combat
campaign.
3.3.7 Pilot Recovery Time.
Any B-2 sortie planned to exceed 16 hours is considered a long-duration sortie
[5:55]. AFI 11-2B-2 Volume 1 provides guidance for crew rest durations before and
after long-duration missions. “Aircrew and DNIF cover aircrew will be identified no
later than 72 hours prior to launch” [5:79]. At the 509th BW this is accomplished by
the crew schedulers in the flying squadrons. Pilots may be assigned to a future mission
before they complete their current mission and recovery. This parallel sequence is not
explicitly represented in the model because it would add extra, unrealistic, delays
to the pilot schedules. “The aircrew will be relieved of non-mission related duties 48
hours prior to launch” [5:79]. Before each mission, but after pilot entities in the model
accomplish the flying hour restriction test and medical clearance, they are batched
into aircrews (consisting of two pilots) and assigned a mission. The simulation then
moves them to a hold block for 48 hours. In this time, the pilots accomplish their
mission-planning (learning routes, targets, communication channels, etc.) and take
their preflight crew rest. Preflight crew rest is normally mandated as 12 consecutive
hours, immediately preceding a sortie, in which the pilot has the opportunity to get
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at least eight hours of sleep. The 48 hours relief from normal duties includes time for
additional preflight crew rest.
“Units are encouraged to use any reasonable means to shorten an extended crew
duty day, such as using preflight crews, minimizing show times, etc” [5:79]. Dur-
ing normal operations, aircrews arrive at the aircraft one hour or more before their
scheduled takeoff time in order to verify that the B-2 is in safe flying condition, has
the proper weapon load, etc., and to ready the plane for flight. The model assumes
that other available pilots who are between missions and not resting will accomplish
preflight so that the mission aircrew can proceed directly from crew rest to an aircraft
readied for takeoff.
“Post-flight crew rest should be proportionate to the length of the flight duty
period . . . For all long-duration sorties post-flight rest requirement is a minimum of
24 hours, plus one half hour for every time zone crossed in flight” [5:79]. Given the
possible durations for both the combat and ferry missions, the model assumes that
12 time zones have been crossed and allots the pilots 30 hours to rest after a mission.
Before the aircrew begins their post-flight rest, they must accomplish a debriefing
in which they make a record of any significant events during the mission as well as
any issues with the aircraft which may warrant maintenance before the next mission.
In the model, debriefs are assigned triangularly-distributed durations of 30 minutes,
45 minutes, and 60 minutes. Post-combat debrief at the stopover location is more
extensive and includes recording target conditions, bomb damage assessment, hostile
force contacts, etc. These post-combat debriefs are assigned triangularly-distributed
durations of one hour, two hours, and three hours.
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3.3.8 Pilot Deadheading.
Just after the pilot entities are generated in the simulation, the pilots to be dead-
headed to the stopover location are separated from the standard mission flow. These
pilots are moved to the stopover, rest, and are ready to fly ferry missions when the
B-2s return from combat.
3.3.9 B-2 Turn Time.
The time between successive flights for an aircraft is called the turn time and
is driven by post-flight and preflight maintenance activity requirements [22:3]. The
Air Force further defines maintenance turn time as “the time required to prepare a
returning mission-capable aircraft for another sortie. This calculation takes into ac-
count servicing of fuel, oil, and oxygen; the “look” phase of through flight inspection;
and launch preparation” [4:17]. The research scenario simulated involves two oper-
ating locations, Whiteman AFB and a stopover location, with different maintenance
activities driving the turn time at each.
An assumption affecting turn time at the stopover location is that a minimal
number of B-2 maintenance personnel and support equipment are deployed. The
only supported maintenance activities are launch and recovery, standard post-flight
maintenance, and minor unscheduled maintenance necessary to enable a B-2 to be
ferried back to WAFB. Post-flight maintenance at the stopover in the model is as-
signed a minimum of ten hours, maximum of eighteen hours, and an average duration
of twelve hours. Since all pilots at the stopover location are in the rest-combat-rest-
ferry pattern, there are none available to preflight the B-2s for the aircrews departing
on ferry missions. Performing their own preflight does not overly extend the aircrew’s
duty day since the ferry missions are shorter than combat missions.
38
Once a B-2 lands at Whiteman AFB, any unspent munitions are unloaded and
returned to the weapon storage and staging area. The simulation models this delay
with 30 minutes minimum, 60 minutes average, and 90 minutes maximum. After any
munitions are unloaded, post-flight maintenance is performed with the same modeled
distribution as at the stopover location.
Another additional maintenance action available only at WAFB in this scenario is
low-observable (LO) maintenance. As a LO (or stealth) platform, one of the primary
advantages of the B-2 over other bombers is its small radar cross-section which is
engineered to make the B-2 difficult for hostile forces to detect. This research scenario
assumes that the LO coating on the B-2s skin requires some maintenance (even if
minor) before each combat mission. Notional LO maintenance times used are 12, 14,
and 18 hours in a triangular distribution.
3.3.10 Other Assumptions and Limitations.
The model involves several assumptions regarding B-2 operations at the stopover
location. The first is that any B-2s with unexpended munitions are treated the same
as empty B-2s. In reality, B-2s would likely have to be unloaded before maintenance
or refueling. The second assumption is that every B-2 in the model is required to
undergo post-flight maintenance at the stopover. A suggested further refinement of
the model is to have B-2s with no live munitions onboard perform an engine running
crew change (ERCC) if an aircrew is available and rested. During actual operations,
this type of seamless scheduling would be feasible with integrated mission planning
across the B-2 fleet. Finally, since this is a generic scenario, it is assumed that the
stopover location has the capacity to hold all of the B-2s if necessary. Without this
assumption there would need to be a constraint preventing combat missions from
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being launched if the stopover would not have ramp space available for another B-2
by the time it would arrive.
The entire B-2 fleet is assumed to be occupied with combat operations. Ready
Aircrew Program (RAP) proficiency flights for combat-qualified pilots are canceled
for the duration of the operation because all combat-qualified pilots are flying combat
and ferry missions at a rate greater than RAP requirements, so additional proficiency
sorties are unnecessary. Additionally, there are no B-2s available for student pilot
training flights. It is assumed that the training of new B-2 pilots is put on hold and
these officers assist with scheduling and other ground duties at WAFB.
The research model results and findings regarding the required number of B-2
pilots for the scenario and conditions discussed here are presented in Chapter 4.
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IV. Findings and Analysis
4.1 Analysis Overview
For each of the four B-2 mission capable (MC) rates examined in this study,
the simulation model is used to generate combat mission completion data for 94
combinations of pilot manning levels and number of pilots deadheaded. These factor-
level combinations are referred to as experiment treatments.
Both of the pilot-related variables are incremented by multiples of 10. Initial
exploratory model runs showed that higher fidelity input values produce output values
which are so closely-spaced that they are well inside the uncertainty of the parameters
included in this research version of the simulation model. Stepping the values by 10s
greatly reduces the computing time required to generate the output for each scenario.
Total pilot manning is varied from 40 to 180. The number deadheaded is allowed to
range from zero up to the nearest multiple of 10 which is less than or equal to one
half of the total number of pilots.
Each time that an experiment treatment is replicated (or re-run), different values
are randomly selected for the activity durations and probabilities within the model,
as discussed in section 3.1.2. With each replication, another value for the number
of completed combat missions is added to the calculation of the average output for
that treatment. Increasing the number of replications allows the reported average to
approach the true average number of combat missions that the system represented by
the model would support under the conditions of that experiment treatment. “Since
the individual replications are independent and identically distributed,” a confidence
interval may be be constructed around the expected true average value, based on
the number of replications and the average reported value [14:36]. A 95% confidence
interval is a set of upper and lower values which contain the system’s true average
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value with 95% probability. Replicating an experiment treatment numerous times
allows the width of the confidence interval (which is centered around the average
reported value) to be reduced, producing higher statistical confidence in the reported
average.
Each experiment treatment in this study is run for 100 replications, which is
shown to be sufficient to reduce the overall output variance to an acceptable level.
The average number of combat missions completed for each treatment is the reported
simulation output. This number is reported as an integer due to the level of uncer-
tainty built into the initial research version of this model.
Table 3 demonstrates the impact of increasing the replication count on a single
experiment treatment (the treatment illustrated happens to be the indicated optimum
point for the 88% MC Rate). For the treatment examined, 60 replications is sufficient
to reduce the width of the 95% confidence interval to the point that it includes
only one value for the number of combat missions. Beyond 60 replications, with
95% confidence, the model reports 312 missions accomplished. Some experiment
treatments with factor-level combinations significantly different from the indicated
optimal point in each scenario exhibit greater variability in the number of missions.
Table 3. Model Output Variability Decrease with Increased Replications
Combat Missions Confidence Interval
B-2s Pilots Deadheaded Replications Average Min Max Half-Width Lower Upper
15 150 50 20 312 306 314 0.8437 311 313
15 150 50 40 312 306 314 0.5193 311 313
15 150 50 60 312 306 315 0.4443 312 312
15 150 50 80 312 306 315 0.3532 312 312
15 150 50 90 312 306 315 0.3259 312 312
15 150 50 100 312 306 315 0.3157 312 312
15 150 50 200 312 306 315 0.2390 312 312
15 150 50 300 312 306 315 0.1987 312 312
15 150 50 400 312 306 315 0.1678 312 312
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Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 in this chapter present the average number of combat missions
observed across the 100 scenario replications of each of the 94 treatments. Each table
represents one of the four scenarios for which the MC rate is held constant and only
total B-2 pilot manning and the number of pilots deadheaded are varied. Common
random numbers (as described in section 3.1.3) are used to further reduce the variance
of the output values and increase confidence in the comparison across scenarios.
4.2 Identifying Optimal Manning
It is assumed that for the factor-level combinations explored in this research,
combat capability is strictly increasing until it reaches the global maximum and that
there are no local maximizing points. This research does not prove mathematically
that the indicated optimal manning level is indeed the global optimum, however, the
data tables and contour figures presented in this chapter suggest that this is the case.
In order to be more concise, the indicated optimal pilot manning level is referred to
as the optimal level for the remainder of this chapter.
Since the demand on the B-2 fleet for training flights during peacetime increases
with the number of pilots, the smallest number of pilots which yields the largest
number of combat missions is the optimal manning level. Additionally, for the com-
bat scenario explored, travel costs increase and productivity at Whiteman Air Force
Base (WAFB) decreases with the number of pilots deadheaded, thus that number is
minimized as much as possible without negatively affecting total combat capability.
Using the data tables provided in each of the following sections, these minimiza-
tions are identified through the following simple algorithm:
1. Beginning with the top leftmost output value, assign a counter i to the current
row and a column counter j to the current column.
2. Assign the value of the current cell (i, j) to a variable max.
43
3. Assign the current value of i to a variable optimum.
4. Assign the current value of j to a variable deadhead.
5. Increment the column counter.
6. If the value in the current cell (i, j) is strictly greater than max, overwrite max
with the value in (i, j).
7. If the current cell (i, j) is nonempty, return to step 5.
8. If the current cell (i, j) is empty, reset the column counter j to its original value.
9. Increment the row counter i.
10. If the current cell (i, j) is empty, STOP. For the current mission capable rate,
optimum equals the indicated optimal pilot manning level, max equals the
maximum number of combat missions, and deadhead equals the best examined
number of pilots to deadhead.
11. If the current cell (i, j) is nonempty, return to step 6.
The following sections present the data and findings generated by the model used
in this research.
4.3 Research Model Findings at 53% MC Rate
Recall that Table 2 in section 3.3.2 lists the average number of B-2 aircraft avail-
able for flying at each of the four mission capable rates examined in this research.
Those selected MC rates, and the corresponding number of available B-2s, are each
used in the research model in order to generate the number of combat missions com-
pleted in a 90-day continuous combat scenario. This 53% MC rate scenario is chosen
as the baseline to which the subsequent scenarios are compared.
The results with the B-2 MC rate at 53% are presented in Table 4. With only
9 B-2s available, 188 combat missions in 90 days is the maximum number possible
regardless of the number of pilots. Using the optimal pilot manning level and dead-
heading number identification algorithm, 100 pilots is selected as the optimal total
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manning level. There is a plateau effect noticeable both in Table 4 as well as graph-
ically in Figure 7. The model has identified the point of diminishing returns, above
which adding more pilots does not increase the number of completed combat mis-
sions. Below this manning level, a shortage of pilots constrains the possible number
of missions; above it, the mission capable rate or some activity in the aircraft schedule
is the constraining factor.
Table 4. Combat Capability at 53% Mission Capable Rate
Total B-2 Number Deadheaded
Pilots 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
40 94 104 83
50 95 128 121
60 95 143 150 125
70 95 145 173 161
80 95 145 181 183 162
90 95 145 181 187 184
100 95 145 181 188 187 183
110 95 145 181 188 188 187
120 95 145 181 188 188 187 186
130 95 145 181 188 188 187 187
140 95 145 181 188 188 187 187 186
150 95 145 181 188 188 187 187 186
160 95 145 181 188 188 187 187 186 185
170 95 145 181 188 188 187 187 186 185
180 95 145 181 188 188 187 187 186 185 185
It must be noted that on the contour plots such as Figure 7, only the intersection
points of the two factors are generated from the model output data. The contour
lines shown between the intersections are an artifact of the graphing software, and
are not likely to be accurate.
Under the assumptions and uncertainties inherent in this model, if the B-2 MC
rate remains near its 2010 value (which is just above the rate used in this scenario) the
509th Bomb Wing is currently manned at the optimal level. If called on to perform
a continuous combat rotation, deadheading 30 pilots would yield the highest combat
mission throughput possible. However, the limitations and additional research sug-
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Figure 7. Contour Plot of Combat Capability at 53% Mission Capable Rate
gestions presented in section 5.3 are vital to understanding the degree of applicability
of this assessment.
4.4 Research Model Findings at 65% MC Rate
A B-2 fleet mission capable rate of 65% translates to 11 aircraft on average avail-
able for flying operations. The results from running the model under these conditions
are listed in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 8. The smallest maximum number of
combat missions achievable is 104; 10 higher than the smallest value for the previous
scenario solely because of the addition of two aircraft. The optimal combination of
pilot manning and deadheading here is found to be 110 pilots with 40 of them dead-
headed. In this case, the greatest number of combat missions executed in 90 days is
229, more than double the lowest total under this scenario. Adding 10 pilots to the
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baseline level of 100, in addition to increasing average aircraft availability to 11 B-2s,
total combat capability is 41 sorties greater than the maximum with 53% MC.
Table 5. Combat Capability at 65% Mission Capable Rate
Total B-2 Number Deadheaded
Pilots 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
40 104 105 84
50 116 131 121
60 117 153 153 126
70 117 166 179 164
80 117 168 199 194 166
90 117 168 210 218 202
100 117 168 211 226 223 203
110 117 168 211 227 229 224
120 117 168 211 227 229 228 223
130 117 168 211 227 229 229 228
140 117 168 211 227 229 229 228 227
150 117 168 211 227 229 229 228 227
160 117 168 211 227 229 229 228 227 227
170 117 168 211 227 229 229 228 227 227
180 117 168 211 227 229 229 228 227 227 226
Scanning down the columns of any of the tables of results in this chapter confirms
one hypothesis of this research. Each column, taken individually, contains the number
of combat missions completed as the pilot manning level is varied, but fleet MC rate
and number of pilots deadheaded is held constant. As an example, the first column
of Table 5 represents a 65% MC rate and not deadheading any pilots to the stopover.
Under these conditions, the number of combat missions stops increasing at 60 pilots.
This plateau effect is seen in every column of the four peformance measure tables in
this chapter.
4.5 Research Model Findings at 76% MC Rate
If the conditions are in place for the B-2 fleet to be available at a 76% mission
capable rate, on an average day 13 aircraft are able to be flown. The results from
running the model under these conditions are listed in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure
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Figure 8. Contour Plot of Combat Capability at 65% Mission Capable Rate
9. The optimal number of pilots is 140, a significant increase over the baseline. 40 of
these pilots are selected to be deadheaded to the stopover point and form the initial
cadre of pilots which ferry the B-2s back to WAFB after the combat missions. 271
combat missions are launched during the 90-day operation. This improvement of 83
missions over the baseline requires 40 additional pilots.
It is interesting to note that the smallest maximum number of combat missions
achievable increases by only 13 from the baseline, to 107. Using the notional param-
eter values, the model identifies that in the case with 40 pilots and 13 aircraft, pilot
manning has again become the limiting factor.
Also of note in Table 6, the cell just above the optimal value of 271 missions
contains the same value (270) as the cells below the optimum. This is an example
of the effect of the randomness built into the model to represent durations of actual
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Table 6. Combat Capability at 76% Mission Capable Rate
Total B-2 Number Deadheaded
Pilots 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
40 107 105 84
50 128 132 122
60 138 158 153 126
70 139 178 181 165
80 138 189 206 198 167
90 138 189 224 225 205
100 138 189 234 248 238 208
110 138 189 236 262 261 242
120 138 189 236 264 269 263 243
130 138 189 236 264 270 269 264
140 138 189 236 264 271 270 268 263
150 138 189 236 264 270 270 269 268
160 138 189 236 264 270 270 269 269 267
170 138 189 236 264 270 270 269 269 268
180 138 189 236 264 270 270 269 269 268 267
maintenance and operations activities, not known with certainty. Two identical activ-
ities performed under nearly identical conditions may have different durations for any
number of reasons. One example from aircraft maintenance is that a “dropped tool”
event can occur when a tool, fastener, or some other small part goes missing during
a maintenance activity. All maintenance stops until the item is found because any
foreign object left in the inner workings of an engine could have catastrophic effects.
By contrast, the majority of the 100 model runs under these conditions happened to
benefit from shorter randomly-drawn activity times and, on average, one additional
combat mission was completed over the apparent upper limit.
4.6 Research Model Findings at 88% MC Rate
The final scenario examined in this research is the case in which the B-2 fleet
sustains a mission capable rate of 88%. This MC rate leads to an average of 15 of
the total 20 aircraft available at any time. Table 7 and Figure 10 present the results
for this scenario. 312 combat missions is the average maximum number generated by
49
Figure 9. Contour Plot of Combat Capability at 76% Mission Capable Rate
the model at this MC rate, with the optimal pilot and deadheading combination. 150
pilots are required, with 50 of them deadheaded, in order to achieve the 312 missions.
This scenario requires an average increase in availability of 6 aircraft over the
baseline rate of 53%, and would also require increasing the total number of B-2 pilots
well over the baseline level of 100. Referencing Table 10 in Appendix B, it is evident
that in 2010 no US Air Force manned aircraft fleet sustained a mission capable rate
above 85%. Consequently, this final research scenario is very likely above the feasible
upper limit of performance achievable for the B-2. However, further refinements in the
model, as suggested in section 5.3, are required before using it for any decision-quality
analysis along these lines.
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Table 7. Combat Capability at 88% Mission Capable Rate
Total B-2 Number Deadheaded
Pilots 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
40 108 105 84
50 133 133 122
60 153 159 154 126
70 159 183 182 165
80 160 201 209 199 169
90 160 209 232 228 207
100 160 211 249 254 241 209
110 160 211 258 276 270 248
120 160 211 259 291 294 279 250
130 160 211 259 296 306 302 282
140 160 211 259 297 309 309 303 282
150 160 211 259 297 309 312 309 303
160 160 211 259 297 309 312 311 309 303
170 160 211 259 297 309 312 311 310 308
180 160 211 259 297 309 312 311 310 309 307
4.7 Deadheading Findings
For a given total number of pilots assigned, deadheading a portion of them to
the stopover location at the start of combat operations is shown to increase the
number of combat missions that the 509th BW is able to deliver. Table 8 is similar
to the tables of combat mission count output, but it simply shows how many pilots
remain at WAFB as the main contingent. When these pilots are not in the pre- or
post-mission rest cycles, they are available to perform their normal management and
training duties which allow the B-2’s operations to continue to run smoothly. They
are also closer to their families and sleeping in their own beds, factors which reduce
the stress of combat and allow for better focus on the mission.
The cells corresponding to the optimal pilot and deadheading levels for all four MC
scenarios are highlighted in Table 8. Each of these identified combinations results in
retaining between 64% and 72% of the pilot force at Whiteman AFB. This suggests
that, for an optimally-manned pilot force, deadheading one-third of the available
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Figure 10. Contour Plot of Combat Capability at 88% Mission Capable Rate
pilots to the stopover location may be used as a guideline for general planning in the
absence of further detailed analysis.
4.8 Summary
As hypothesized, combat mission capability under each examined mission capable
rate plateaus at the optimal pilot manning level. The identified optimal manning
level for a particular fleet MC rate allows the 509th Bomb Wing to execute the most
sorties possible in a combat scenario while avoiding the accumulation of excess wear
on the airframes due to peacetime training. Also, for manning levels at or above
the optimum, combat mission capability is seen to decrease if the number of pilots
deadheaded is too great. An additional finding is that if only a fixed number of pilots
(fewer than optimal) can be assigned to the combat rotation, the model may be used
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Table 8. Pilots Available at Whiteman AFB Decrease with Increased Deadheading
Total B-2 Number Deadheaded
Pilots 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
40 40 30 20
50 50 40 30
60 60 50 40 30
70 70 60 50 40
80 80 70 60 50 40
90 90 80 70 60 50
100 100 90 80 70 60 50
110 110 100 90 80 70 60
120 120 110 100 90 80 70 60
130 130 120 110 100 90 80 70
140 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70
150 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80
160 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80
170 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90
180 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90
to determine the proportion of those pilots to deadhead in order to maximize combat
mission throughput.
Chapter 5 presents a brief discussion on the overall conclusions and recommenda-
tions generated by this research effort.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In support of US Air Force and Department of Defense efforts to conserve re-
sources without sacrificing capability, this research examines B-2 pilot manning for
the 509th Bomb Wing. Development of a discrete-event simulation model allows the
indicated optimal pilot manning level to be identified for an expected fleet readiness
level. Optimal pilot manning ensures that the maximum possible number of combat
missions may be delivered when the B-2 is employed in a conflict. Further, limiting
pilot manning to the identified optimal level decreases the accumulation of excess
wear on the B-2 airframes; extending the viable life of the fleet and safeguarding the
deterrent and combat capabilities that the B-2 provides to the United.
The 90-day combat scenario modeled satisfies flight safety restrictions on pilot
scheduling and uses stochastically-generated durations for the operations and main-
tenance activities required for sustained combat operations.
5.2 Conclusions
The scenario and notional model parameters used in this research do not support
a recommendation to decrease B-2 pilot manning. Section 5.3 details the major
limitations of this research and provides recommendations for future work to generate
more precise results, potentially leading to different recommendations for the 509th
Bomb Wing.
At each of the four levels of B-2 fleet mission capable (MC) rate studied, output
from the model developed in the course of this research includes a point of diminishing
returns. Pilot manning above this identified level does not increase the number of
combat missions which may be launched during the 90-day scenario, and increases
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peacetime wear on the B-2 aircraft. Below this manning level, the number of trained
and available pilots constrains the possible number of missions. With manning above
the indicated level, some activity in the aircraft schedule or the number of aircraft
available under the current mission capable rate is the constraining factor.
This research also determines a general planning factor which the 509th BW may
use when conducting combat operations from Whiteman AFB (WAFB) and post-
combat ferry missions from a stopover location. For an optimally-manned B-2 pilot
force, deadheading approximately one-third of the available pilots to the stopover
location results in the highest number of completed combat missions, and allows
pilots not in the combat and ferry mission cycle to focus on their duties at WAFB.
5.3 Limitations and Areas for Additional Research
The notional, unclassified estimates used to generate operations and maintenance
activity durations in the research model are known to be inaccurate. Further study of
the pilot manning level at the 509th Bomb Wing is planned and should incorporate
actual historical activity durations as the parameters for the triangular distributions
in the simulation model. Analysis of historical data may suggest that a statistical
distribution other than triangular (i.e., beta, gamma, or Weibull) is a better fit for
activity durations. The two other stochastic values used in the model are the pass/fail
probability for a pilot’s preflight medical clearance and the probability that a B-2
returns from combat without all munitions having been expended. These probabilities
should also be updated with historical data from the 509th BW.
Higher-fidelity input data allows the model to generate more precise capability
assessments. After running the model with a broad range of independent variable
values, as was done in this research, it is suggested that follow-on work focus on
the neighborhood around the indicated optimum point in each scenario. Decreasing
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the increments used for the experiment treatments and tailoring their scope for each
specific scenario will allow more data points to be investigated within the area of
interest. Computing time will be better spent running more replications in a narrower
region in order to decrease output variability. These techniques will allow follow-on
work to more accurately identify the level at which pilot manning is optimal for a
specified expected mission capable rate.
There may be two or more buffers built into the formal manning level. These are
not addressed in this research, but could be added on top of the findings from a higher-
fidelity version of the model. One type of positive buffer would be the addition of extra
B-2 pilots required to keep the current manning level at WAFB at the proper level
while making up for pilots who are in assignments away from WAFB. Another type of
buffer, that could lower the required manning level, would be to not assign B-2 pilots
to the various staff functions across the wing. The model used in this research assumes
that pilots are allowed to focus on their flying proficiency and combat qualifications.
In this case, the staff positions at the wing and squadron levels would be filled by
officers with the proper experience but not currently on flying status (possibly not
even B-2 pilots). These officers would not be required to maintain currency in the
B-2, thereby saving wear on the fleet. However, employing staff officers in addition to
B-2 combat pilots could potentially generate higher manpower costs than the savings
from reduced B-2 wear justifies.
5.4 Recommendations
The model development methodology employed in this research – incorporating
realistic scheduling constraints and all applicable flight, maintenance, and pilot activ-
ities – is applicable to any small aircraft fleet which has an objective of maximizing
the number of flights completed. The greatest gain may be realized by flying or-
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ganizations which expend the majority of their flying hours on pilot training and
proficiency.
Beyond the identification of an optimum number of pilots, aircraft fleet managers
face additional manning decisions based on risk prioritization and may be able to
further increase fleet longevity. Pilot manning at the optimum level may be employed
in order to provide the maximum capability when required, until the aircraft fleet can
no longer support the required activity level. Optionally, if a decreased maximum
capability is acceptable, leadership may choose to staff pilots at a suboptimum level.
Suboptimal pilot manning would result in even greater reductions to fleet wear and
would preserve the airframes even more, allowing the fleet the ability to operate at
the chosen capability level and support pilot currency requirements further into the
future.
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Appendix A. Operational Scenario ARENA Model
Table 9. Simulation Model Notional Distribution Parameters
Block Name Action Distribution Units Min Mode Max CRN Stream
Assign CombatDuration Assign Triangular Hours 23 28 34 20
Assign FerryDuration Assign Triangular Hours 20 24 26 50
Deadhead Flight Delay Triangular Hours 30 36 40 160
Debrief S Delay Triangular Hours 1 2 3 30
Debrief W Delay Triangular Hours 0.5 1 1.5 60
Fuel and Preflight S Delay Triangular Hours 1.5 2 2.5 150
Fuel and Preflight W Delay Triangular Hours 1.5 2 2.5 10
LO MX Delay Triangular Hours 12 14 18 90
Mission Plan and Crew Rest S Delay Constant Hours 48
Mission Plan and Crew Rest W Delay Constant Hours 48
PostFlight MX S Delay Triangular Hours 10 12 18 40
PostFlight MX W Delay Triangular Hours 10 12 18 80
Recover S Delay Constant Hours 30
Recover W Delay Constant Hours 30
ShutDown S Delay Constant Hours 1
ShutDown W Delay Constant Hours 1
Unload Weapons Delay Triangular Hours 0.5 1 1.5 70
Weapon Load Delay Triangular Hours 1 2 4 100
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Appendix B. FY 2010 Air Force Mission Capable Rates
Table 10 lists the published fiscal year 2010 mission capable (MC) rates for all Air Force
aircraft systems (adapted from [19]). Average mission capable (MC) hours per aircraft per
week is calculated by Equation (5). Average not mission capable (NMC) hours per aircraft
per week is calculated by Equation (6).
Table 10. FY 2010 Air Force Mission Capable Rates and Weekly Aircraft Availability
Aircraft MC Rate MC hours per week NMC hours per week
Q-4 41.64 % 70 98
B-1B 43.82 % 74 94
C-5A 52.66 % 88 80
CV-22 54.30 % 91 77
B-2 54.86 % 92 76
C-5B 59.59 % 100 68
F-22 60.94 % 102 66
EC-130J 65.17 % 109 59
HC-13 69.90 % 117 51
A-10 70.46 % 118 50
EC-130H 70.62 % 119 49
F-15C 70.96 % 119 49
E-3 71.60 % 120 48
F-15E 72.46 % 122 46
C-130H 73.85 % 124 44
B-52H 74.61 % 125 43
HH-60 74.65 % 125 43
KC-10A 74.78 % 126 42
F-16 75.39 % 127 41
T-38C 76.15 % 128 40
C-130E 76.67 % 129 39
T-1A 79.73 % 134 34
T-6A 80.34 % 135 33
T-38A 80.41 % 135 33
KC-135T 80.41 % 135 33
UH-1 80.87 % 136 32
KC-135R 81.06 % 136 32
E-8 81.08 % 136 32
U-2 81.22 % 136 32
C-130J 82.27 % 138 30
C-17A 84.43 % 142 26
MQ-9 91.95 % 154 14
MQ-1 92.98 % 156 12
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Appendix C. Blue Dart
B-2 Pilot Manning for Increased Aircraft Longevity and Mission Capable Rates
Captain Jason S. Hamilton
Air Force Institute of Technology
Phone: (937) 255–3636
jason.hamilton.8@us.af.mil
Three US Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers struck 45 targets inside Libya on the opening
night of Operation Odyssey Dawn. The B-2 provides the unique capability to strike deep
inside hostile airspace and cripple air defenses, allowing other coalition aircraft to execute
their missions from a superior position. But could it be possible that the requirement to
have a sufficient number of pilots trained and ready for major combat operations is actually
wearing out the B-2 fleet? The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), working with the
509th and 131st Bomb Wings at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) and Air Force Global
Strike Command (AFGSC) at Barksdale AFB, is researching a potential relationship be-
tween the number of B-2 pilots and the expected lifespan of the B-2 fleet.
The crash and total loss of one B-2 at Anderson AFB in 2008 leaves the fleet with
only 20 aircraft; 19 at Whiteman AFB for operations and training, and one assigned to Air
Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB. Of the 19 at Whiteman, however, only about
half are available at any given time to be used for peacetime flying. Why is this so? There
are four main reasons: As an operational bomber, several B-2s are always kept available
for real-world contingency use. At any given time, approximately three B-2s are in pro-
grammed depot maintenance (PDM), a one-year complete overhaul process. One or two
B-2s are often parked for several months at a time for the installation of upgraded compo-
nents (communications equipment, radars, etc.). Finally, there are occasionally a few B-2s
awaiting replacement parts.
The remaining B-2s have to accommodate the entirety of the 509th and 131st Bomb
Wings’ daily peacetime flying activities; the majority of which involve pilots being trained
or maintaining currency. Other B-2 flying requirements are for testing of upgraded software
and components under operational conditions, flight safety verification after PDM or other
major maintenance, and advanced tactics training for pilots in Weapons School (think Top
Gun). As pilots retire, new pilots are trained to replace them; each requiring an average of
fifty hours of training flights.
Much like airline pilots, fully-trained B-2 pilots are required to log at least a minimum
number of flight hours per month in order to “stay current” by Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration safety standards. However, unlike airline pilots who can stay current during their
normal work schedule, a B-2 pilot’s job is to fly combat missions — which doesn’t happen
often. During peacetime they are required to stay current by flying what amount to extra
training missions, simulating their combat duties. This separation between wartime mission
execution and peacetime training separates military combat pilots from airline pilots and
even from most military transport pilots. Combat aircraft can actually accumulate more
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wear due to training than due to their combat missions.
One aspect of the flying requirements placed on the B-2 fleet that the Bomb Wings
could potentially control is the total number of pilots. The current Air Force approach to
this issue is to separate pilots by their tasking level. Combat pilots focus on training and
preparation for combat. They are assigned day-to-day jobs, but nothing that will take their
focus away from proficiency training for too long. Staff pilots, in leadership positions, focus
on the management of the flying organizations and are only required to fly half as many
hours per month as the combat pilots. If the 509th and 131st could perform their combat
taskings with fewer pilots overall, and find the proper balance between staff and combat
pilots, they could lessen the stress that training and monthly proficiency flights put on each
of the B-2 aircraft.
Using computer simulation, the first phase of this AFIT research involved building a
model which represents all of the maintenance and operations activities which would make
up the schedule for the B-2 aircraft and pilots if they were called upon to fight a drawn-out
war. The simulation is used to identify the overall pilot manning level which allows the
maximum possible number of combat missions to be launched under a given set of mainte-
nance and aircraft availability constraints. Through the refinement and use of this model,
the 509th and 131st Bomb Wings and AFGSC will be able to gain insight into the effect of
pilot manning on combat capability and the training load on the B-2 fleet.
Captain Jason Hamilton is a recent graduate of the Air Force Institute of Technology.
63
Bibliography
[1] Abara, Jeph. “Applying Integer Linear Programming to the Fleet Assignment Prob-
lem”, Interfaces, 19(4):20–28, July-August 1989.
[2] Air Force Global Strike Command. “Factsheets: B-2 Spirit”, 23 April 2010. URL
www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheets.asp?fsID=82.
[3] “B-2 engine catches fire at Andersen”, Air Force Times, 1 March 2010. URL www.
airforcetimes.com/news/2010/03/gns_b2_fire_andersen_030110/.
[4] Department of the Air Force. Determining Mission Capability and Supportability Re-
quirements, AFI 10-602. Washington: HQ USAF, 18 March 2005.
[5] Department of the Air Force. B-2 Aircrew Training, AFI 11-2B-2, Volume 1. Wash-
ington: HQ USAF, 9 June 2010.
[6] Department of the Air Force. General Flight Rules, AFI 11-202, Volume 3. Washington:
HQ USAF, 22 October 2010.
[7] Fry, Michael J., Michael J. Magazine, and Uday S. Rao. “Firefighter Staffing Including
Temporary Absences and Wastage”, Operations Research, 54(2):353–365, March-April
2006.
[8] Gates, Robert M., Secretary of Defense. “Statement on Department Budget and Effi-
ciencies”, 6 January 2011. URL http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?
SpeechID=1527. The Pentagon, Washington DC.
[9] Gates, Robert M., Secretary of Defense. “Untitled Speech”, 4 March 2011. URL
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1543. Address to Air
Force Academy cadets. USAFA, Colorado Springs CO.
[10] Gershkoff, Ira. “Optimizing Flight Crew Schedules”, Interfaces, 19(4):29–43, July-
August 1989.
[11] Gosavi, Abhijit, Emrah Ozkaya, and Aykut Kahraman. “Simulation Optimization for
Revenue Management of Airlines with Cancellations and Overbooking”, OR Spectrum,
29(1):21 – 38, 2007.
[12] Gu, Zonghao, Ellis L. Johnson, George L. Nemhauser, and Yinhua Wang. “Some
Properties of the Fleet Assignment Problem”, Operations Research Letters, 15(2):59–
71, March 1994.
[13] Hafizogullari, S., P. Chinnusamy, and C. Tunasar. “Simulation Reduces Airline Mis-
connections: a Case Study”. Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, 2002,
volume 2, 1192 – 1198. December 2002.
[14] Kelton, W. David, Randall P Sadowski, and David T Surrock. Simulation with Arena,
(4th edition). New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.
64
[15] Kohl, Niklas and Stefan E Karisch. “Airline Crew Rostering: Problem Types, Model-
ing, and Optimization”, Annals of Operations Research, 127:223–257, March 2004.
[16] Ott, James. “Innovative Strokes for Readiness”, Overhaul & Maintenance, 10 July
2008. URL www.aviationweek.com/aw/story_generic.jsp?challen=om&id=news/
omcvr708.xml.
[17] Richter, Helmut. “Thirty Years of Airline Operations Research”, Interfaces, 19(4):3–9,
July-August 1989.
[18] Rolfsen, Bruce. “Moisture confused sensors in B-2 crash”, Air Force Times, 5 June
2008. URL www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/06/airforce_b2_crashreport_
060508w/.
[19] Rolfsen, Bruce. “Osprey availability still hovering at 50 percent”, Air Force Times,
29 November 2010. URL www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/11/air-force
-osprey-availability-about-50-percent-112910w/.
[20] Rosenberger, J.M., Andrew J. Schaefer, David Goldsman, Ellis L. Johnson, Anton J.
Kleywegt, and George L. Nemhauser. “A Stochastic Model of Airline Operations”,
Transportation Science, 36(4):357 – 377, 2002.
[21] Sandhu, Rivi and Diego Klabjan. “Integrated Airline Fleeting and Crew-Pairing Prob-
lems”, Operations Research, 55(3):439–456, May-June 2007.
[22] Sherali, Hanif D., Ebru K. Bish, and Xiaomei Zhu. “Airline Fleet Assignment Concepts,
Models, and Algorithms”, European Journal of Operations Research, 172(1):1–30, July
2006.
[23] Wikipedia. “Triangular Distribution – Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia”,
2011. URL http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Triangular_distribut
ion&oldid=413942060. These images modified and used under authorization of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
65
Vita
Captain Jason S. Hamilton was homeschooled in Waco, Texas and graduated in 1997.
He accomplished his undergraduate studies at McLennan County Community College and
Baylor University. In May 2003, he graduated from Baylor University with a Bachelor of
Science degree in Applied Mathematics with a minor in Engineering. Jason was commis-
sioned into the US Air Force through AFROTC Detachment 810.
Captain Hamilton’s first assignment was to the 72d Test and Evaluation Squadron at
Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Jason performed test director and analyst duties for several
major test projects, including the Nuclear Weapon System Evaluation Program and the
B-2’s integration of the 500-pound MK-82 JDAM.
In August 2006, Jason was assigned to Detachment 4 of the Air Force Operational Test
and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) at Peterson AFB, Colorado. He provided test analy-
sis to space acquisition programs including Space Based Space Surveillance and Wideband
Global SATCOM.
In 2008, while assigned to AFOTEC, Jason deployed to the US Air Forces Central (US-
AFCENT) Combined Air & Space Operations Center (CAOC) for three months and served
as the Afghanistan Operations Analyst on the CAOC’s Operational Assessment Team.
Also while in Colorado, Captain Hamilton was selected to be in the initial class of the
Space Education Consortium; a joint program between Air Force Space Command and the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS). Jason completed the program in April
2009; earning a Master’s Certificate in Space Systems Management from UCCS.
In August 2009, Jason entered the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Graduate School
of Engineering and Management at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. At AFIT, he focused his
studies on Deterministic Operations Research and Operations Modeling. Upon graduation,
he will be assigned to the Air Force Personnel Center’s Analysis Branch at Randolph AFB,
Texas.
66
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704–0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection
of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From — To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
24–03–2011 Master’s Thesis Aug 2009 – Mar 2011
DETERMINING PILOT MANNING
FOR BOMBER LONGEVITY
Jason S. Hamilton, Capt, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB OH 45433-7765
AFIT-OR-MS-ENS-11-08
Lt Col Robert S. Spalding III
509 OG/CC
509 Spirit Blvd, Ste 106
Whiteman AFB, MO 65305
(660) 687-3207, robert.spalding@whiteman.af.mil
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
In support of US Air Force efforts to conserve resources without sacrificing capability, this research
examines the question of whether the 509th Bomb Wing could continue to provide maximum combat capability with
fewer assigned pilots. During peacetime, pilot proficiency training comprises the majority of annual flying hours for the
small B-2 bomber fleet. Optimal pilot manning will decrease the accumulation of excess wear on the airframes; helping to
extend the viable life of the B-2 fleet and preserve the deterrent and combat capabilities that it provides to the United
States.
The operations and maintenance activity flows for B-2 aircraft and pilots in a notional sustained combat scenario are
constructed in an Arena discrete-event simulation model. The model provides the capability to determine optimum
manning levels for combat-qualified B-2 pilots across a range of fleet mission capable rates. Determination of actual
optimum manning levels is sensitive to duration and probability parameters which are unavailable for use in this work.
Notional parameter estimates are used to assess combat mission capability and pilot manning.
Pilot manning, Mission capable rate, Discrete event simulation, Fleet viability
U U U UU 78
James W. Chrissis
(937) 255–3636 ext 4606; james.chrissis@afit.edu
